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Abstract
In the context of the two-stage threshold model of decision making,
with the agent’s choices determined by the interaction of three “struc-
tural variables,” we study the restrictions on behavior that arise when
one or more variables are exogenously known. Our results supply nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for consistency with the model for all
possible states of partial knowledge, and for both single- and multi-
valued choice functions.
1 Introduction
Recent work in the theory of individual choice behavior has modified the
classical preference maximization hypothesis in various ways. One approach
has been to weaken the consistency properties that preferences are ordinarily
assumed to possess.1 Another has been to study relationships between pref-
erence and choice other than straightforward maximization.2 And a third has
been to permit additional, non-preference-related factors—as well as multiple
preferences—to influence decision making in some way.3
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†Queen Mary University of London. Email: [m.mariotti@qmul.ac.uk].
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1For example, Eliaz and Ok [9], Mandler [14], Nishimura and Ok [23], and others allow
preferences to be incomplete (following in the tradition of Aumann [2] and Bewley [5]).
2Models of this sort have been axiomatized by Baigent and Gaertner [3], Eliaz et al. [10],
Mariotti [19], and Tyson [30], among others.
3In addition to the contributions cited below, we have for example the work of Bossert
and Sprumont [6] and Masatlioglu and Ok [22] on status-quo bias; Ambrus and Rozen [1]
and Rubinstein and Salant [25] on multi-self and framing models; Caplin and Dean [7],
1
Under the last of the three approaches just listed, the revealed preference
exercise required to characterize a given model can be quite complex, since
multiple factors must be inferred simultaneously from behavior. Moreover,
models with more than one component make possible a variant of the usual
characterization problem: An outside observer can test a collection of choice
data for consistency with the model while treating one or more components
as known.
For example, suppose that we postulate a decision maker who maximizes a
utility function over the alternatives that he or she notices, but pays attention
only to those options with a sufficiently high level of salience (with regard to
the visual or another sensory system). If salience is directly measurable, then
the relevant question is whether these measurements and the choice data to-
gether can be reconciled with our behavioral hypothesis.4 And this means, of
course, finding suitable assignments of the unobserved components—namely,
the utility function and the salience thresholds.
As another example, imagine a choice among lotteries by a satisficing
agent who decides between the options deemed satisfactory by following a
social-norm ordering. On the one hand, the social norm might be known to
the theorist, in which case it and the choice data must be jointly reconciled
with the model by specifying the utilities and satisficing thresholds. Alterna-
tively, perhaps the norm is unknown but we wish to introduce a maintained
assumption of risk neutrality. In the latter case our search will be for satis-
ficing thresholds (relative to expected value) plus a social norm that together
generate the observed behavior.
Evidently, questions of this sort can be posed for any multiple-component
model of choice, with any subset of the components taken to be known. In an
electoral setting we might plausibly know the economic interests of a voter
but not his or her ideology, while in a managerial setting we might assume
profit maximization subject to an unobserved market-share constraint. Note
that a model component could be designated as “known” due to an assump-
tion, a physical observation, econometric estimates from a separate data set,
or background knowledge of the agent’s environment, among other reasons.
In this paper we explore the issue of testing model consistency under
partial knowledge—one that appears to be largely unexamined in the context
of axiomatic choice theory. To give this enterprise some concreteness, we
shall commit to a particular model of how choices are determined by the
Cherepanov et al. [8], and Masatlioglu and Nakajima [20] on search and consideration sets;
and Mandler et al. [15], Manzini and Mariotti [17], and Bajraj and U¨lku¨ [4] on procedural
models.
4The observer might be able to determine salience levels, say, using knowledge of the
physiology of vision and the spatial arrangement of the choice alternatives.
2
interaction of various factors. We adopt a framework that is deliberately
very general, and can accommodate the examples mentioned above. For
each menu A of alternatives, the “two-stage threshold” (TST) model of choice
specifies that the agent will select an option that solves
max
x∈A
g(x) subject to f(x) ≥ θ(A). (1)
Here the model components, which we shall call “structural variables,” are
real-valued functions f and g defined on the space of alternatives, plus a
real-valued function θ defined on the space of menus.
The TST framework has no fixed interpretation. Indeed, the model over-
laps with several existing theories based on very different hypotheses about
the process of decision making. One possibility is to interpret f as a measure
of consideration or attention priority, θ as a cognition-threshold map, and g
as a utility function; as in the contributions of Lleras et al. [13] and Masatli-
oglu et al. [21].5 Another possibility is to interpret f as the utility function,
θ as a utility-threshold map, and g as a salience measure; as in Tyson [31].
Under these two interpretations the first stage of the model captures, respec-
tively, the “consideration set” (a concept from the marketing literature) and
Simon’s [27] notion of satisficing.6
In its general form the TST model has been characterized by Manzini et
al. [18], who demonstrate that Equation 1 can accommodate a wide range of
behavior patterns. Indeed, when each set of acceptable choices is required
to be a singleton, it is straightforward to show that any observed data set
can be generated by the model (see Proposition 2.6). Moreover, even if we
allow multiple acceptable choices, the constraints imposed by the framework
itself remain weak (see Theorem 2.5). While the theories mentioned above
reduce this freedom by imposing specialized restrictions on the structural
variables, our approach will be to fix one or more variables completely and
leave the others entirely unconstrained.7 We then seek to identify the forms
of behavior that remain consistent with the model.
Given a particular interpretation of the model, some structural variables
will be more naturally assumed to be known than others. Since our intention
is to avoid favoring any specific viewpoint, we provide a complete and hence
interpretation-free collection of characterization results: For any strict subset
of the three structural variables, we supply necessary and sufficient conditions
for behavior to be compatible with the TST model when the variables in the
5Related models are studied by Eliaz and Spiegler [11] and Spears [28].
6For further details of these interpretations of the TST framework, see [18, pp. 879–881].
7These two approaches can also be combined. For instance, Theorem 4.7 below can be
modified to incorporate the “expansiveness” restriction on 〈f, θ〉 imposed by Tyson [31].
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subset are known and all others are unrestricted.8 This collection of results—
together with posing the partial knowledge question for multiple-component
choice models—makes up the contribution of the paper.
Broadly speaking, our analytical method is to use the choice data together
with the known variables to infer as much information as we can about the
unobserved variables. We then look for ways in which this information could
be self-contradictory, and formulate axioms that rule them out. Such axioms
will always be necessary for behavior to be compatible with the model. And
if our search for contradictions is thorough enough, they will also be sufficient
(though demonstrating this may require extended arguments).
For example, suppose that g is known while both f and θ are unobserved
(cf. Theorem 4.7). If alternatives x and y are both on menu A, and if also
g(x) > g(y), then clearly x and y cannot both be chosen from A. This is
the simplest illustration of how choice data and a known structural variable
together can lead to a contradiction, which must be ruled out axiomatically.
Suppose now that f and g are both known, with only θ unobserved
(cf. Theorem 4.8). Since g is known, the variety of contradiction seen in
the preceding paragraph must still be avoided. Furthermore, if alternatives
x and y are both on menu A, and if also f(x) ≥ f(y) and g(x) ≥ g(y), then
we cannot have that y is chosen from A unless x too is chosen. These two
types of contradictions turn out to exhaust the implications of the model
when both f and g are known, which is to say that axioms ruling them out
provide the desired characterization.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines the
TST framework and reviews the axiomatization of the unconstrained model
given by Manzini et al. [18]. Our novel results are stated first in Section 3
for the special case of single-valued choice, and then in Section 4 for the
multi-valued case. Section 5 contains a brief concluding discussion. Proofs
of the general (i.e., multi-valued) versions of our results can be found in the
Appendix.
8We assume that knowledge of one structural variable has no direct implications for
the unknown variables, which can be chosen arbitrarily to generate the observed behavior.
This assumption will not hold under interpretations of the model that motivate joint
restrictions on the variables. For example, in [31] the functions f and θ are linked by
the property of “expansiveness.” It is even possible that knowledge of one variable could
completely determine another, for instance if θ(A) equals the average |A|−1
∑
x∈A f(x) of
the available f -values. Dependencies like these could certainly be taken into account in
the characterization exercises we carry out, but we shall not impose any such link between
structural variables as a blanket restriction on the model.
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2 The two-stage threshold model
Let X be a nonempty, finite set, and let D ⊆ A = 2X \ {∅}. The elements of
X are called alternatives, the elements of D are called menus, and any map
C : D → A such that ∀A ∈ D we have C(A) ⊆ A is called a choice function.
The choice set C(A) contains the alternatives that are chosen from menu
A. A choice function is single-valued if it returns only singleton choice sets.
Without loss of generality, we shall assume that ∀x ∈ X we have {x} ∈ D.
In the TST model, the choice set associated with menu A is constructed
by maximizing g(x) subject to f(x) ≥ θ(A). Here f : X → ℜ is the primary
criterion, g : X → ℜ the secondary criterion, and θ : D → ℜ the threshold
map. These three components of the model are termed structural variables,
any triple 〈f, θ, g〉 is a profile, and any pair 〈f, θ〉 is a primary profile.
Given a primary profile 〈f, θ〉 and an A ∈ D, write Γ(A|f, θ) = {x ∈ A :
f(x) ≥ θ(A)} for the subset of available alternatives whose primary criterion
values are above the relevant threshold. The TST model can now be defined
formally as follows.
2.1 Definition. A two-stage threshold representation of C is a profile 〈f, θ, g〉
such that ∀A ∈ D we have C(A) = argmaxx∈Γ(A|f,θ) g(x).
In order to axiomatize this model, Manzini et al. [18] use several binary
relations that are revealed by the agent’s choices. The separation relation
encodes situations where one alternative is chosen and a second (available)
alternative is rejected.
2.2 Definition. Let xSy if ∃A ∈ D such that x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ A \ C(A).
The togetherness relation encodes situations where two alternatives both are
chosen, and its transitive closure is the extended togetherness relation.9
2.3 Definition. Let xTy if ∃A ∈ D such that x, y ∈ C(A), and let xEy if
∃z1, z2, . . . , zn ∈ X such that x = z1Tz2T · · ·Tzn = y.
Finally, the first-stage separation relation encodes separations that must be
attributed to the primary criterion, since an extended togetherness relation-
ship guarantees equal values of the secondary criterion.10
2.4 Definition. Let xFy if xEy and xSy.
9Recall that a relation R is transitive if xRyRz ⇒ xRz, and that the transitive closure
of R is the smallest transitive relation containing it.
10More explicitly, if xEy then x = z1Tz2T · · ·Tzn = y, which under the TST model
implies that g(x) = g(z1) = g(z2) = · · · = g(zn) = g(y) for some z1, z2, . . . , zn ∈ X. If also
xSy, then under the model we must have f(x) ≥ θ(A) > f(y) for some A ∈ D.
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Manzini et al. [18, pp. 876–879] prove that acyclicity of this last relation
is the one and only condition needed to characterize the TST model in the
absence of known structural variables.11
2.5 Theorem. A choice function has a two-stage threshold representation if
and only if the relation F is acyclic.
Moreover, since the relations T , E, and F are all empty in the single-valued
case, here the acyclicity condition holds trivially and so consistency with the
model is assured.
2.6 Proposition. Any single-valued choice function has a two-stage thresh-
old representation.
3 Single-valued choice
3.1 One known variable
We study partial knowledge restrictions on the TST model first under the
simplifying assumption of single-valued choice, and considering situations
where just one of the three structural variables is known. As we shall see, even
this minimal type of partial knowledge restriction gives empirical content to
a framework that, as shown in Proposition 2.6, is otherwise vacuous: In each
situation with one known variable the model can be characterized by an
acyclicity condition like that employed in Theorem 2.5.
Known primary criterion. Suppose that the primary criterion f is known,
while the threshold map θ and secondary criterion g are not, and let x, y ∈ A.
In this case knowledge that f(y) ≥ f(x) implies that y survives the first stage
of choice from A if x does so; i.e., that x ∈ Γ(A|f, θ) ⇒ y ∈ Γ(A|f, θ). But
then from the observation xSy we can deduce that g(x) > g(y), since x and y
must have been separated at the second stage. In other words, second-stage
superiority of one alternative over another is revealed by the relation defined
as follows in terms of the known f and observed C.
3.1 Definition. Let xHfy if f(y) ≥ f(x) and xSy.
Since Hf implies strict second-stage superiority between alternatives, this
relation must be acyclic for the model to hold. That is to say, acyclicity of Hf
is necessary for C to admit a TST representation consistent with the partial
profile 〈f, ·, ·〉.
11Recall that a relation R is acyclic if x1Rx2R · · ·Rxn ⇒ x1 6= xn.
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3.2 Example. Let f(x) = f(y) = 1, C(xy) = x, and C(xyz) = y. If 〈f, θ, g〉
were a TST representation of C, then f(y) ≥ f(x) and C(xy) = x together
would imply g(x) > g(y), but at the same time f(x) ≥ f(y) and C(xyz) = y
would imply g(y) > g(x), a contradiction.
Our first partial-knowledge result for the TST model states that acyclicity
of Hf is sufficient as well as necessary, and thus characterizes the situation
in question.12
3.3 Proposition. A single-valued choice function has a two-stage threshold
representation consistent with 〈f, ·, ·〉 if and only if Hf is acyclic.
Observe that once we have acyclicity of Hf , which is needed to construct a
suitable revealed secondary criterion, no further axiom is required to ensure
the existence of an appropriate threshold map—this comes “for free.”
Known secondary criterion. Now suppose that it is the secondary criterion
g that is known, so that our task is to construct the primary profile. Here
the first-stage separation relation used in Theorem 2.5 is unhelpful (since it
is always empty in the single-valued case), but we can use our knowledge of
g to define a new revealed relation that performs the same role.
3.4 Definition. Let xHgy if both g(y) ≥ g(x) and xSy.
3.5 Proposition. A single-valued choice function has a two-stage threshold
representation consistent with 〈·, ·, g〉 if and only if Hg is acyclic.
Somewhat surprisingly, both the definitions of Hf and Hg and the associated
characterization results are exactly parallel, even though the two stages of
the TST model are not in any sense interchangeable.
Known threshold map. Next we consider the possibility of a known threshold
map θ. In this situation if we can find A,B ∈ D and y ∈ A∩B such that y ∈
C(B) and θ(B) ≥ θ(A), then clearly we can conclude that f(y) ≥ θ(A). If
moreover both x ∈ C(A) and y /∈ C(A) (noting that under single-valuedness
the latter is immediate for y 6= x), then y must have been eliminated from A
at the second stage and hence we must have g(x) > g(y).
To capture this method of deducing second-stage superiority from the
known θ and observed C, we define the critical threshold for alternative y.
3.6 Definition. Let M(y|θ) = max{θ(A) : A ∈ D ∧ y ∈ C(A)}.
12Since Proposition 3.3 and all other results in Section 3 follow from the corresponding
results in Section 4, they are not given separate proofs.
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In other words, the critical threshold is the highest threshold of any menu to
whose choice set the alternative belongs, with the obvious consequence that
y ∈ C(A)⇒M(y|θ) ≥ θ(A).13 The argument above is then expressed in the
construction of the following revealed relation.
3.7 Definition. Let xHθy if ∃A ∈ D such that M(y|θ) ≥ θ(A), x ∈ C(A),
and y ∈ A \ C(A).
Once again our characterization imposes acyclicity, and no additional axioms
are needed.
3.8 Proposition. A single-valued choice function has a two-stage threshold
representation consistent with 〈·, θ, ·〉 if and only if Hθ is acyclic.
3.2 Two known variables
To complete our analysis of single-valued choice functions, we proceed to
axiomatize the TST model in situations where two of the structural variables
are known.
Known secondary criterion plus one primary variable. When both criteria
are known, the assertion xHfy continues to imply that g(x) > g(y). But
instead of merely being checked for cycles, as in Proposition 3.3, inequalities
of this sort can now be tested directly against the observed g.
3.9 Example. Let f(x) = 1, f(y) = 2, g(x) = g(y) = 0, and C(xy) = x. If
〈f, θ, g〉 were a TST representation of C, then f(y) ≥ f(x) and C(xy) = x
together would imply g(x) > g(y), which is known to be false.
Our result for this situation states that consistency of deduced and observed
second-stage superiority is precisely what is needed for the desired charac-
terization.
3.10 Proposition. A single-valued choice function has a two-stage threshold
representation consistent with 〈f, ·, g〉 if and only if xHfy ⇒ g(x) > g(y).
In a similar way, our axiom for the case of known θ can be adapted to
characterize the case of known θ and g. Instead of checking the revealed rela-
tion Hθ for cycles, we simply test it against the observed secondary criterion.
3.11 Proposition. A single-valued choice function has a two-stage threshold
representation consistent with 〈·, θ, g〉 if and only if xHθy ⇒ g(x) > g(y).
13Note that since for each y ∈ X we have {y} ∈ D and y ∈ C({y}), and since D is a
finite set, the critical threshold is always well defined.
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Known primary profile. Finally, consider a situation in which the full primary
profile 〈f, θ〉 is known. Since f is known, the conditionM(y|θ) ≥ θ(A) in the
definition of Hθ (which guarantees that y survives the first stage of choice
from menu A) can be replaced with a direct assumption that f(y) ≥ θ(A).
This modification leads to the following revealed relation, which continues to
encode second-stage superiority.
3.12 Definition. Let xHfθy if ∃A ∈ D such that f(y) ≥ θ(A), x ∈ C(A),
and y ∈ A \ C(A).
As might be expected, our new relation must be acyclic if C is to admit
a TST representation. This acyclicity is not sufficient, however, because it
is also possible for the known 〈f, θ〉 and the observed C to contradict each
other outright—in a way that has nothing to do with inferences about the
second stage.
3.13 Example. Let f(x) = 1, f(y) = 3, θ(xyz) = 2, and C(xyz) = x. If
〈f, θ, g〉 were a TST representation of C, then x ∈ C(xyz) would imply that
f(x) ≥ θ(xyz), which is known to be false.
The additional axiom required says simply that alternatives in the choice set
assigned to A can have primary criterion values no smaller than θ(A).14 Our
characterization result for the present case therefore appears as follows.
3.14 Proposition. A single-valued choice function has a two-stage thresh-
old representation consistent with 〈f, θ, ·〉 if and only if Hfθ is acyclic and
f [C(A)] ≥ θ(A).
Our axiomatizations of the TST model with partial knowledge and single-
valued choice are summarized in Figure 1, which also shows the logical rela-
tionships among these results. For example, starting from Proposition 3.10,
we can discard our knowledge of g and thereby arrive at Proposition 3.3.
Hence any choice function covered by the former result must be covered by
the latter (as well as by Proposition 3.5, since we can discard our knowledge
of f).15 While our axioms will need to be generalized appropriately to deal
with the multi-valued case, these logical relationships will remain intact.
14In other words, ∀x ∈ C(A) we have f(x) ≥ θ(A); an assertion that we shall abbreviate
as f [C(A)] ≥ θ(A).
15In terms of the relevant axioms, xHfy ⇒ g(x) > g(y) can hold only if Hf is acyclic.
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Prop. 2.6: 〈·, ·, ·〉 iff
—
❄❄ ❄
Prop. 3.5: 〈·, ·, g〉 iff
Hg acyclic
Prop. 3.3: 〈f, ·, ·〉 iff
Hf acyclic
Prop. 3.8: 〈·, θ, ·〉 iff
Hθ acyclic
Prop. 3.10: 〈f, ·, g〉 iff
xHfy ⇒ g(x) > g(y)
Prop. 3.11: 〈·, θ, g〉 iff
xHθy ⇒ g(x) > g(y)
Prop. 3.14: 〈f, θ, ·〉 iff
Hfθ acyclic,
f [C(A)] ≥ θ(A)
❄ ❄ ❄❄❄ ❄
Figure 1: Summary of characterization results for single-valued choice.
4 Multi-valued choice
4.1 Preliminary comments
While useful and intuitive, the results in Section 3 are insufficient for a com-
plete understanding of TST representations with known structural variables.
This is because the maintained assumption of single-valued choice substan-
tially limits the scope of the theory and—as we shall argue below—has no
fully satisfactory justification in the present context. On the contrary, there
are good reasons here to prefer results derived in a multi-valued setting.
One reason is that the standard theory of utility maximization requires
multi-valued choice in order to allow for indifference. The supposedly more
flexible TST framework should be a true generalization of the standard the-
ory, and for this an extension to the multi-valued environment is needed. A
related point is that under the consideration-set interpretation of the TST
model (see Section 1), it is desirable to avoid imposing a no-indifference as-
sumption on the agent’s utility function g.
A second reason to prefer results derived in the more general setting is
that single-valuedness is antithetical to the concept of multi-stage models of
decision making, where final choices arise from two or more discrete phases
during which the available alternatives are narrowed down. If any given phase
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always reduces the menu to a single alternative, then of course all later phases
become irrelevant. Thus if we routinely study choice procedures under the
assumption of single-valuedness, then we cannot meaningfully embed them
in a multi-stage model.
4.2 One known variable
We proceed now to generalize Propositions 3.3, 3.5, and 3.8 to the multi-
valued setting.
One known primary variable. When f is known, the relation Hf continues to
reveal second-stage superiority. But in the multi-valued case alternatives can
also be related by E, which is easily seen to reveal second-stage indifference.
Choice data can thus be incompatible with the TST model even when there
is no Hf -cycle, as seen in the following example.
4.1 Example. Let f(x) = 1, f(y) = 2, f(z) = 0, C(xy) = x, C(xz) = z, and
C(yz) = yz. If 〈f, θ, g〉 were a TST representation of C, then f(y) ≥ f(x)
and C(xy) = x together would imply g(x) > g(y), and likewise f(x) ≥ f(z)
and C(xz) = z would imply g(z) > g(x). But then C(yz) = yz would imply
g(y) = g(z) > g(x) > g(y), a contradiction.
The choice function in this example has F empty (and therefore vacuously
acyclic), so there is no difficulty in exhibiting a TST representation when all
three structural variables are free. It is only in combination with the specified
f that C conflicts with the model, due to the mixed cycle yEzHfxHfy.
With such cases in mind, we define formally the relation of being linked
by a chain of alternatives connected sequentially by either Hf or E.
4.2 Definition. Let xWfy if ∃z1, z2, . . . , zn ∈ X such that z1 = x, zn = y,
and for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1} we have either zkHfzk+1 or zkEzk+1.
This relation reveals weak second-stage superiority, and strict superiority if
at least one link in the chain is via Hf . The condition needed for a character-
ization, analogous to Richter’s [24, p. 637] Congruence axiom, is then that
no alternative bear Wf to itself except via extended togetherness.
4.3 Theorem. A choice function has a two-stage threshold representation
consistent with 〈f, ·, ·〉 if and only if xWfy ⇒ ¬[yHfx].
The case of a known θ can be handled similarly. Here Hθ reveals strict
second-stage superiority, and the following relation reveals a weak analog.
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4.4 Definition. Let xWθy if ∃z1, z2, . . . , zn ∈ X such that z1 = x, zn = y,
and for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1} we have either zkHθzk+1 or zkEzk+1.
Our result then uses a Congruence-like condition to identify the data sets
consistent with the model.
4.5 Theorem. A choice function has a two-stage threshold representation
consistent with 〈·, θ, ·〉 if and only if xWθy ⇒ ¬[yHθx].
Known secondary criterion. When g is the known variable, it remains true in
the multi-valued case that Hg must be acyclic. But since this relation reveals
first-stage superiority, combining it with extended togetherness is unhelpful.
Instead, we need to check that revealed second-stage indifference agrees with
the observed secondary criterion, which is to say that alternatives related by
E have identical g-values.
4.6 Example. Let g(x) = 1, g(y) = 2, C(xz) = xz, and C(xyz) = yz. If
〈f, θ, g〉 were a TST representation of C, then C(xz) = xz would imply that
g(x) = g(z), while C(xyz) = yz would imply that g(z) = g(y). But then we
would have g(x) = g(y), which is known to be false.
4.7 Theorem. A choice function has a two-stage threshold representation
consistent with 〈·, ·, g〉 if and only if Hg is acyclic and xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y).
4.3 Two known variables
Finally, we develop multi-valued versions of Propositions 3.10, 3.11, and 3.14.
Known secondary criterion plus one primary variable. When the primary and
secondary criteria are both known, we must again test revealed second-stage
indifference for consistency with the observed g. This test may be conducted
independently from the consistency check on Hf used in Proposition 3.10,
resulting in the following characterization.
4.8 Theorem. A choice function has a two-stage threshold representation
consistent with 〈f, ·, g〉 if and only if xHfy ⇒ g(x) > g(y) and xEy ⇒ g(x) =
g(y).
Conveniently, the same straightforward modification also succeeds in the
case of known g together with θ.
4.9 Theorem. A choice function has a two-stage threshold representation
consistent with 〈·, θ, g〉 if and only if xHθy ⇒ g(x) > g(y) and xEy ⇒ g(x) =
g(y).
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Known primary profile. When the first-stage structural variables are both
known, weak second-stage superiority is revealed by the following relation.
4.10 Definition. Let xWfθy if ∃z1, z2, . . . , zn ∈ X such that z1 = x, zn = y,
and for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1} we have either zkHfθzk+1 or zkEzk+1.
As in Theorems 4.3 and 4.5, we can use this relation to strengthen the re-
quirement thatHfθ be acyclic. In combination with the condition that chosen
alternatives survive the (fully observable) first stage, this strengthened axiom
achieves our final characterization.16
4.11 Theorem. A choice function has a two-stage threshold representation
consistent with 〈f, θ, ·〉 if and only if xWfθy ⇒ ¬[yHfθx] and f [C(A)] ≥ θ(A).
Our axiomatizations with partial knowledge and multi-valued choice are
summarized in Figure 2. As anticipated in the discussion of Figure 1 above,
the conditions used when two structural variables are known together imply
those used when each is known separately (which are in turn always stronger
than the condition needed when all three variables are free). Moreover, it is
not difficult to confirm that each single-valued characterization in Section 3
is a corollary of the corresponding multi-valued result.17
5 Discussion
The axiomatizations summarized in Figures 1 and 2 constitute a complete
analysis of choice under partial knowledge in the context of the two-stage
threshold model. Our results involve a number of acyclicity and Congruence-
like conditions similar to those used in traditional choice theory, as well as
other conditions with fewer precedents in the literature.
In addition to establishing these specific results, a secondary goal of the
paper has been to introduce the issue of partial knowledge itself. Outside of
the TST context, partial-knowledge characterizations can be developed for
choice-theoretic models that include different “structural variables.” If the
16Unlike Theorems 4.3 and 4.5, Theorem 4.11 can be viewed as a direct consequence of
Richter’s [24] classical axiomatization. This is because when the entire primary profile is
observable, the subsets Γ(A|f, θ) of alternatives that survive the first stage are themselves
observable. Provided f [C(A)] ≥ θ(A), these survivor subsets can be treated as surrogate
menus, and the TST characterization problem reduces to the classical exercise. (The same
is true, mutatis mutandis, for Proposition 3.14.)
17For example, under single-valued choice we have that E is empty, Wf is the transitive
closure of Hf , and the condition that xWfy ⇒ ¬[yHfx] (used in Theorem 4.3) amounts to
acyclicity of Hf (used in Proposition 3.3).
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Thm 2.5: 〈·, ·, ·〉 iff
F acyclic
❄❄ ❄
Thm 4.7: 〈·, ·, g〉 iff
Hg acyclic,
xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y)
Thm 4.3: 〈f, ·, ·〉 iff
xWfy ⇒ ¬[yHfx]
Thm 4.5: 〈·, θ, ·〉 iff
xWθy ⇒ ¬[yHθx]
Thm 4.8: 〈f, ·, g〉 iff
xHfy ⇒ g(x) > g(y),
xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y)
Thm 4.9: 〈·, θ, g〉 iff
xHθy ⇒ g(x) > g(y),
xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y)
Thm 4.11: 〈f, θ, ·〉 iff
xWfθy ⇒ ¬[yHfθx],
f [C(A)] ≥ θ(A)
❄ ❄ ❄❄❄ ❄
Figure 2: Summary of characterization results for multi-valued choice.
models have features in common with the present framework—such as mul-
tiple stages or threshold effects—then it may be hoped that our techniques
will be transferable to some degree to these new settings.
For example, consider the following variant of the “rational shortlist
method” (RSM) model proposed by Manzini and Mariotti [16]. In the first
of two stages, the decision maker eliminates any alternative that is not max-
imal with respect to an asymmetric binary relation ≻.18 Then, in the second
stage, a criterion function g is optimized in the usual way. Since maximiza-
tion over menu A of an asymmetric ≻ cannot in general be represented with
a threshold structure Γ(A|f, θ), this model is not covered by the TST frame-
work. Moreover, since optimization of a secondary criterion is stronger than
the second-stage procedure specified by Manzini and Mariotti, the new model
is a special case of an RSM.
The model described above would place restrictions on behavior even
under single-valued choice.19 Furthermore, we might wonder what additional
restrictions are implied by knowledge of either ≻ or g. Assuming a known ≻
would lead to a situation very similar to that in Theorem 4.11, whose proof
can be suitably modified (see Footnote 16). Alternatively, assuming a known
18Recall that a relation R is asymmetric if xRy ⇒ ¬[yRx].
19This fact is implied by Manzini and Mariotti’s [16] characterization of RSMs in general.
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g would lead to a situation resembling that in Theorem 4.7, and one that
poses more of a challenge. Here the objective would be to use the known g
and the observed C together to infer information about the unknown ≻, and
to assemble a set of axioms that rules out all possible contradictions.20
Another setting in which partial knowledge restrictions could be studied
is that of Salant and Rubinstein’s [26] “salient consideration functions.” Here
choice sets have the structure C(A) =
⋃n
i=1{x ∈ A : ∀y ∈ A ¬[yPix]}, where
n is a natural number and each Pi is a relation. Apart from the constraints
intrinsic to this model, we can ask what additional behavioral restrictions are
implied by knowledge of n, or of one or more of the Pi relations. And similar
questions can be posed in the setting of Kalai et al.’s [12] “rationalization by
multiple rationales,” another prominent multiple-factor model of choice.
A Appendix
As illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, results for TST representations with more
known variables can be used to help prove results with less known variables.
For example, to demonstrate that the conditions in Theorem 4.7 are sufficient
for a representation consistent with 〈·, ·, g〉, it is enough to define a primary
criterion f such that the conditions in Theorem 4.8 hold.
We shall make good use of this proof strategy, and so in order to preserve
a sequential logical progression we shall prove our characterization results
non-consecutively. Specifically, we prove first Theorem 4.8, followed by The-
orems 4.3 and 4.7. We then prove Theorem 4.11, followed by Theorem 4.5.
And lastly we prove Theorem 4.9.
A few items of notation not employed in the main text will be used in the
proofs: We write xR∗y if ∃z1, z2, . . . , zn ∈ X such that x = z1Rz2R · · ·Rzn =
y (thereby defining the transitive closure R∗ of the relation R). Furthermore,
we writeK(x) for the E-equivalence class of x ∈ X, and K = {K(x) : x ∈ X}
for the associated partition of X.21
Proof of Theorem 4.8. Let 〈f, θ, g〉 be a TST representation of C, whereupon
the implication xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y) is immediate. For x, y ∈ X, if xHfy then
f(y) ≥ f(x) and xSy. Hence ∃A ∈ D with x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ A \ C(A), so
that f(y) ≥ f(x) ≥ θ(A) and g(x) > g(y). Thus xHfy ⇒ g(x) > g(y).
20As a first step, observe that if x ∈ C(A), y ∈ A \C(A), and g(y) ≥ g(x), then for any
B ⊇ A we cannot have y ∈ C(B).
21Recall that a binary relation is an equivalence if it is reflexive, symmetric, and transi-
tive. (Reflexivity ofRmeans that xRx, and symmetry means that xRy ⇒ yRx.) Extended
togetherness inherits the properties of reflexivity and symmetry from togetherness, and is
transitive by construction.
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Conversely, suppose that both xHfy ⇒ g(x) > g(y) and xEy ⇒ g(x) =
g(y). Given A ∈ D, let θ(A) = minx∈C(A) f(x), so that for each x ∈ C(A)
we have f(x) ≥ θ(A). Moreover, for any y ∈ C(A) we have xTy, xEy, and
g(x) = g(y). Now let w ∈ C(A) be such that f(w) = θ(A). If ∃z ∈ A \C(A)
with f(z) ≥ θ(A), then both wSz and f(z) ≥ θ(A) = f(w). But then wHfz
and so g(w) > g(z). It follows that 〈f, θ, g〉 is a TST representation of C.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Let 〈f, θ, g〉 be a TST representation of C. We then
have xHfy ⇒ g(x) > g(y) and xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y) by Theorem 4.8, and it
follows that xWfy ⇒ g(x) ≥ g(y)⇒ ¬[yHfx].
Conversely, suppose that xWfy ⇒ ¬[yHfx]. ForK1, K2 ∈ K, letK1 ≫ K2
if there exist x1 ∈ K1 and x2 ∈ K2 such that x1Hfx2.
A.1 Lemma. ≫ is acyclic.
Proof. Suppose instead that ∃K1, K2, . . . , Kn ∈ K with K1 ≫ K2 ≫ · · · ≫
Kn ≫ K1. For each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} there must exist xk, yk ∈ Kk such that
x1Hfy2Ex2Hfy3E · · ·HfynExnHfy1Ex1. But then both y2Wfx1 and x1Hfy2,
contradicting y2Wfx1 ⇒ ¬[x1Hfy2].
Since ≫ is acyclic, ≫∗ is a strict partial order. By Szpilrajn’s Theorem [29],
it follows that there exists a linear order≫ such that ∀K1, K2 ∈ K we have
K1 ≫ K2 ⇒ K1≫ K2. Now let xQy if K(x)≫ K(y), so that Q is a weak
order, and take any numerical representation g of Q.22
For x, y ∈ X we now have xEy only if K(x) = K(y), and so g(x) = g(y).
Moreover, xHfy only if K(x)≫ K(y), K(x)≫ K(y), and g(x) > g(y). But
then C has a TST representation consistent with 〈f, ·, g〉 by Theorem 4.8.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. Let 〈f, θ, g〉 be a TST representation of C, whereupon
the implication xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y) is immediate. Moreover, for x, y ∈ X we
have xHfy ⇒ g(x) > g(y) by Theorem 4.8, which is logically equivalent to
xHgy ⇒ f(x) > f(y). But then Hg is acyclic.
Conversely, suppose that both Hg is acyclic and xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y). Let
xQy if g(y) > g(x) or xHgy, so that ∀w, z ∈ X we have wQ
∗z ⇒ g(z) ≥ g(w).
A.2 Lemma. Q is acyclic.
22Recall that a binary relation is a strict partial order if it is irreflexive and transitive; a
weak order if it is a strict partial order that is negatively transitive; and a linear order if it
is a weak order that is weakly complete. (Irreflexivity of R means that ¬[xRx]; negative
transitivity means that [¬[xRy] ∧ ¬[yRz]] ⇒ ¬[xRz]; and weak completeness means that
[¬[xRy] ∧ ¬[yRx]]⇒ x = y.)
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Proof. Suppose instead that ∃x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ X such that x1Qx2Q · · ·Qxn =
x1. Since Hg is acyclic, there must exist a k < n such that g(xk+1) > g(xk).
But since xk+1Q
∗xk we have also g(xk) ≥ g(xk+1), a contradiction.
Since Q is acyclic, Q∗ is a strict partial order. By Szpilrajn’s Theorem [29],
it follows that there exists a weak order P such that ∀x, y ∈ X we have
xQ∗y ⇒ xPy. Let f be any numerical representation of P .
For x, y ∈ X we now have xHfy only if xSy and f(y) ≥ f(x); and thus
only if ¬[xPy], ¬[xQ∗y], ¬[xQy], and g(x) > g(y), using the definitions of
Q and Hg. But then C has a TST representation consistent with 〈f, ·, g〉 by
Theorem 4.8.
Proof of Theorem 4.11. Let 〈f, θ, g〉 be a TST representation of C, where-
upon the implications x ∈ C(A)⇒ f(x) ≥ θ(A) and xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y) are
both immediate. For x, y ∈ X, if xHfθy then ∃A ∈ D such that f(y) ≥ θ(A),
x ∈ C(A), and y ∈ A \C(A), which implies g(x) > g(y). And it follows that
xWfθy ⇒ g(x) ≥ g(y)⇒ ¬[yHfθx].
Conversely, suppose that both xWfθy ⇒ ¬[yHfθx] and f [C(A)] ≥ θ(A).
For K1, K2 ∈ K, let K1 ≫ K2 if there exist x1 ∈ K1 and x2 ∈ K2 such that
x1Hfθx2.
A.3 Lemma. ≫ is acyclic.
Proof. Suppose instead that ∃K1, K2, . . . , Kn ∈ K with K1 ≫ K2 ≫ · · · ≫
Kn ≫ K1. For each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} there must exist xk, yk ∈ Kk such
that x1Hfθy2Ex2Hfθy3E · · ·HfθynExnHfθy1Ex1. But then both y2Wfθx1 and
x1Hfθy2, contradicting y2Wfθx1 ⇒ ¬[x1Hfθy2].
Since ≫ is acyclic, ≫∗ is a strict partial order. By Szpilrajn’s Theorem [29],
it follows that there exists a linear order≫ such that ∀K1, K2 ∈ K we have
K1 ≫ K2 ⇒ K1≫ K2. Now let xQy if K(x)≫ K(y), so that Q is a weak
order, and take any numerical representation g of Q.
For x, y ∈ X we now have xEy only if K(x) = K(y), and so g(x) = g(y).
Moreover, we have xHfθy only if K(x)≫ K(y), K(x)≫ K(y), and g(x) >
g(y).
Given A ∈ D and x ∈ C(A), we have f(x) ≥ θ(A). Moreover, for any
y ∈ C(A), we have xTy, xEy, and g(x) = g(y). If there exists a z ∈ A\C(A)
with f(z) ≥ θ(A), then we have xHfθz and so g(x) > g(z). It follows that
〈f, θ, g〉 is a TST representation of C.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Let 〈f, θ, g〉 be a TST representation of C. We then
have xWfθy ⇒ ¬[yHfθx] and f [C(A)] ≥ θ(A) by Theorem 4.11. It follows
that ∀x ∈ X we have f(x) ≥M(x|θ). Moreover, for x, y ∈ X we have xHθy
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only if ∃A ∈ D such that f(y) ≥M(y|θ) ≥ θ(A), x ∈ C(A), and y ∈ A\C(A),
which implies xHfθy. Hence xWθy ⇒ xWfθy ⇒ ¬[yHfθx]⇒ ¬[yHθx].
Conversely, suppose that xWθy ⇒ ¬[yHθx]. For each x ∈ X, let f(x) =
M(x|θ). Given A ∈ D and x ∈ C(A), we then have f(x) ≥ θ(A). Moreover,
for each x, y ∈ X we have xHθy ⇐⇒ xHfθy and hence xWθy ⇐⇒ xWfθy.
But then we can conclude that xWfθy ⇒ xWθy ⇒ ¬[yHθx]⇒ ¬[yHfθx], and
so C has a TST representation consistent with 〈f, θ, ·〉 by Theorem 4.11.
Proof of Theorem 4.9. Let 〈f, θ, g〉 be a TST representation of C, whereupon
the implication xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y) is immediate. Moreover, for x, y ∈ X we
have xHθy only if ∃A ∈ D withM(y|θ) ≥ θ(A), x ∈ C(A), and y ∈ A\C(A).
Now let B ∈ D be such that y ∈ C(B) and M(y|θ) = θ(B). It follows that
f(y) ≥ θ(B) = M(y|θ) ≥ θ(A), and so g(x) > g(y). Thus xHθy ⇒ g(x) >
g(y).
Conversely, suppose that both xHθy ⇒ g(x) > g(y) and xEy ⇒ g(x) =
g(y). For each x ∈ X, let f(x) = M(x|θ). Given A ∈ D and x ∈ C(A), we
then have f(x) ≥ θ(A). Moreover, for any y ∈ C(A) we have xTy, xEy, and
g(x) = g(y). If ∃z ∈ A \ C(A) with θ(A) ≤ f(z) = M(z|θ), then xHθz and
so g(x) > g(z). It follows that 〈f, θ, g〉 is a TST representation of C.
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